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Part I: Policy Analysis and Recommendation
On November 17th, 2011, President Obama addressed the Australian parliament and
presented a plan to shift American attention towards the Asia-Pacific region (Beitelman 2012,
1086). This is a policy known as the Pivot, which represents one of the most important issues of
our time: that of America’s relations with China. China is becoming a much more powerful and
important player in global politics and global economy, in fact China is growing at a faster rate
than any other country in history (Schake 2014). The Pivot looks to lock in a substantially
increased investment in the Asia Pacific region (Clinton 2011, 1). Basically, the Pivot is a policy
response by the American government to what many call the top foreign policy problem facing
the United States (Beitelman 2012, 1074; Stuart 2012, 203). By looking at the policies that make
up the Pivot, the purposes and motivations behind it, and how, practically, it has been enacted
today, I have examined the benefits and costs such a policy can have on American foreign
relations. My conclusion is that the Pivot should be modified in order to truly represent how the
United States wants to interact with China the best way possible instead of in a traditional realist
manner that reacts to the Chinese threat.
History
This policy came about as a reaction to China’s rising influence in the world, although
much of it is actually a continuation of policies that have already been undertaken by previous
administrations (Manyin et al. 2012, 144). In many ways, the Pivot is not actually novel at all,
just an extension of various policies of the past, making the Pivot seem more extreme and
important than it actually is. With most of the United States’ resources in the Middle East,
Clinton found it imperative that the United States begin to refocus attention onto Asia. This was
true especially since at the time of the original document, it appeared that unrest in the Middle
East was beginning to decline (Clinton 2011, 57). This policy also comes out of the United
States’ success following the end of World War II when the government created a “network of
institutions and relationships” that helped Europe recover and helped to slow communism
(Clinton 2011, 2). Another thing that influenced the beginning of the Pivot was that after the
1970’s when Deng Xiaoping opened up his country’s economy, China has grown in power, in
wealth, in military, and also in capitalistic tendencies in their economy. A few years ago, starting
at around 2009, when Beijing resisted to compromise at the UN Climate Change Conference, the
United States had begun to have some strained relations with the country. There was a seeming
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belligerence and growing confidence coming from China and the United States saw it as an
opportunity to exert more influence in the region especially among China’s near rivals (Ross
2012). In fact, this Asia strategy was built on the policies of previous administrations (Ross
2012). Ever since the American government first moved a submarine from Europe to Guam in
1997, the United States has been involved in the region (Ross 2012). Both the Clinton and
George W. Bush administrations deployed naval and air weapons systems to Guam and Japan
and has cooperated with various other countries in the area (Ross 2012; Stuart 2012, 204). The
policy action proposed by Clinton is not unlike these actions and builds on them.
One author describes Asia as “the worlds’ most vibrant (but also possibly its most
combustible) continent” (Chellaney 2014). As the main Asian actor in this policy, China was in
economic turmoil after Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward in the 1960s. Afterwards, there was
high inflation between 2009 and 2010 (Ross 2012). Even Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao
acknowledged that worsening inflation could result in the undermining of social stability (Ross
2012). In fact, by June 2010, vegetable prices had gone up by 25 percent and there was rising
unemployment and inequality (Ross 2012). In 2009 rural unemployment was its highest since
1980 (Ross 2012). Then, the government started to focus on economic advancement, and during
the American recession, China’s economy grew by ten percent, beginning China’s economic rise
(Ross 2012). Now, China has one of the fastest growing economies in the world that has
sustained.
The Policy
According to Obama and Clinton in their various addresses about the Pivot during 2011,
the Pivot is built around six key lines of action. These key lines include: strengthening bilateral
security actions, deepening work relationships with emerging powers, engaging with regional
multilateral institutions, expanding trade and investment, forging a broad-based military
presence, and advancing democracy and human rights (Beitelman 2012, 1087). These lines of
action are the backbone of this policy in order to pursue the goal of ensuring that American
leadership will continue well into the century. In the following analysis, each of these six key
lines can be seen through military action, new economic relationships, the struggle with China,
the creation of economic institutions like the TPP, all with the intention of spreading American
influence and values.
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The policy has many components to it. The first key component is the military
component. The military actually plays a fairly large role in this policy. For one, the United
States has increased its defense engagement with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) to help with the conflict between Japan and South Korea (Mohan 2014). This military
action also included an expansion of naval exercises with Japan (Bello 2013). In fact, in 2011,
the United States began the process of sending 2,500 Marines to be stationed in Australia with
the goal of completing that movement by the year 2020 (Bello 2013; LaFranchi 2013; Lieberthal
2011). In many ways, this policy is mostly made up of military action because that is the way
that the American government sees to practically enforce the policy changes. According to
Walden Bello, in his article “Imperial Argument: Washington debates ‘Pivot to Asia’ Strategy,”
this policy is seventy percent military action and only thirty percent diplomatic action (Bello
2013). In fact, much of this military action is supported by the smaller nations in South East Asia
because it helps to contain China’s growing military power that is a threat to the autonomy of
those smaller nations (Beitelman 2012, 1088). Thus, there are ship deployments to Singapore,
the aforementioned troops sent to Australia, and enhanced training and cooperation with
countries like India, Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand. Also, the Philippines has
signed an agreement that allows more visits by U.S. ships and a rotating presence of marines
(Smith 2014). As one author put it, “The U.S. has surrounded China with an ever-increasing ring
of military fire, from NSA surveillance and spy satellites, to Army, Marine, Navy and Air Force
bases; from nuclear-armed submarines and a majority of America’s 11 mammoth aircraft carriers
to warships, bombers and fighters in dozens of varieties; from short-, medium- and long-range
missiles to thousands of nuclear weapons that can be fired from the U.S. and demolish hundreds
of major Chinese cities” (Smith 2014). All of these efforts are meant to do two things: to contain
China and to protect Southeast Asia (Stuart 2012, 205). This Pivot policy is one that is much
broader and covers more geography than any effort like this in the past. American troops are
being placed in more countries and American involvement is just in general on a much broader
scale (Manyin et al. 2012, 150).
Another part of the Pivot is the diplomatic aspect. This includes an increased involvement
in East Asian summits and conferences (LaFranchi 2013). For example, the United States has
now gained entrance into the East Asia Summit, Hilary Clinton, while she was Secretary of
State, attended forums of ASEAN, and Obama even hosted US-ASEAN Summit and attended
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the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summits (LaFranchi 2013; Lieberthal 2011). Much of
this new, increased involvement, is to assist South-east Asian nations that are America’s allies
and help to wean countries from over-dependence on Beijing (Bagchi 2012; Graham 2013, 307).
Not only that, but diplomacy was seen as a way to contain China. The more influence America
has in Asia, the more the United States can ensure adherence to international norms and rules of
conduct (Bello 2013). Clinton used vocabulary such as the “forward-deployed” policy to
describe America’s diplomatic action in this policy. It means that the United States would
continue to dispatch the full range of its diplomatic assets over time (Clinton 2011, 3). A result
of these diplomatic relations are defense treaties with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South
Korea and Thailand as well as other partnerships with Brunei, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Singapore, and Taiwan (Smith 2014).
Not only that, but this policy includes various new economic policies and relationships
between the United States of America and various East Asian countries. The first main economic
change was the vast expansion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is a high-quality trade and
investment platform created by the Bush administration in 2006, which includes many of the
major economies in Asia, except for China (Smith 2014). It is centered around transparency, the
protection of intellectual property, labor rights, and environmental protection (Liebertahl 2011;
Clinton 2011, 11). As one author put it, “the logic of the new Pacific initiative: a free-trade
agreement that includes many of the Asia-Pacific nations along with the United States, but one
that is too demanding for a developing mercantilist nation like China to enter yet” (Prestowitz
2012, 41). Secondly, a new free trade agreement with South Korea was enacted (Lieberthal
2011). One of the main parts of this agreement was that it eliminated tariffs on ninety-five
percent of all of US exports to South Korea (Clinton 2011, 10). The agreement was projected to
help South Korea’s economy grow by six percent (Clinton 2011, 10). In relation to China
specifically, the policy also put forth a plan to invest $50 billion in China, with the expectation
that China would make the economic changes that the U.S. government thought were necessary
(Clinton 2011, 7). Just as the United States helped to promote a stable and prosperous
environment by building a more mature security and economic architecture in Europe after
WWII, the United States hopes to build a network and relationships in order to build up the
region in Asia in which America will be an integral part (Clinton 2011, 2). The hope is to be sure
that there is continued American leadership well into the century (Beitelman 2012, 1087). There

5

is some controversy over this point specifically. Some scholars say that the United States is in no
danger of becoming obsolete or lose leadership anytime soon (Etzioni 2013, 59). Others, the
main supporters of this policy, argue that the world is changing and that it will be necessary for
the United States to take measures to maintain its hegemony (Beitelman 2012, 1076).
The Pivot is motivated by a variety of diplomatic, economic, and strategic factors. These
were the three factors outlined by Clinton in the original document. The first factor is for
diplomatic reasons. The region of Asia spans two oceans, is home to half of the world’s
population, and is home to several of the United States’ key allies. It is also the region of many
important rising powers such as China, India, and Indonesia (Clinton 2011, 1). For this reason, it
is only logical that the United States, as a world power, wants to get involved in the region in
order to maintain diplomatic ties. This, in turn, has an effect on the other two motivations as
well, which are economic and strategic reasons.
The second motivation that Clinton outlines in the original document about the Pivot was
for economic reasons. China needs to be addressed as a rising power with increasing influence,
especially in the economic sector. To this topic, Clinton writes, “Harnessing Asia’s growth and
dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests… Open markets in Asia
provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to
cutting-edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability
of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia” (Clinton 2011, 2).
The economic opportunities in Asia are at this point untapped by the Western world. It could be
very profitable for the United States to have more economic ties in the region. In fact, the stretch
of sea from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific are the world’s most vibrant trade and energy routes
(Clinton 2011, 60). The American government want so interject itself into Asia’s economic
milieu in order for American corporations to become more profitably involved in the region’s
incredible growth (Smith 2014).
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, there is a strategic motivation for the pivot.
Maintaining peace and security in an area with countries like North Korea is crucial global
peace. Transparency in the military activities of the region’s key players is something that
Clinton cites as an important objective for the policy (Clinton 2011, 3). At this moment in
history, the United States is in a unipolar position at the moment and this position of unipolarity
may begin to be threatened by China in the coming years (Beitelman 2012, 1079). In every piece
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of literature that discusses China’s ascension in world power, also discusses American decline,
something that the American government wants to guard against very closely and prevent from
happening (Beitelman 2012, 1073). Therefore, if the United States can have a more involved
presence in Asia, the government can keep an eye on China and limit China’s power as well. By
strategically surrounding China with U.S. allies, which Washington has been building up since
1949, America is able to do this (Smith 2014). The Pivot is actually very dependent on the
willingness of these nations to interact and ally themselves with the United States (Xiang 2012,
119).
Based on realist theory, these motivations make sense (Graham 2013, 311). If the balance
of power is only stable when there is a hegemon since at an international level the world is
anarchic, then it makes sense for the United States to feel the need to step into Asia. Also, if
every country acts only for their own good, then it can be assumed that as China continues to
gain power, China’s motivations are selfish and working towards becoming a global leader
(Beitelman 2012, 1074). In this case, as the hegemonic power, the United States has a right to
feel the need to remain able to check Chinese growth. According to Mearsheimer, a realist
political scientist, war is inevitable and that hegemony is the only insurance for security, so
American action in this way is perfectly acceptable and even necessary for the maintenance of
American power (Mearsheimer 2001). He doesn’t believe that “perpetual peace” is possible
among the great powers of the world (Mearsheimer 2001).
However, there are many things standing in the way of the Pivot being fully enacted.
Because of all of the recent upheavals in the Middle East, this policy has in many ways been put
on hold. Washington is very busy with issues in Iran, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Israel/Palestine,
Afghanistan, drone wars in several other countries, and in the Ukraine (Smith 2014). There are
many parts of the Pivot that have not yet been enacted. Consequently, the President failed to
attend the October meetings of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in 2013 and has
had to cancel visits to U.S. allies in the region (Sanders 10; Graham 2013, 305). This in turn,
pushed back more negotiations for the TPP and instead gave China an opportunity to propose
their own economic partnership, which does not include the United States (Sanders 10). Because
of this, countries wonder if the Pivot will be fully actualized at all. The American government
hopes to put these policies in place in the near future as they try to slowly transition into the
Pivot as they have been doing for the past three years.
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However, Obama has identified “terrorism” as the main direct threat to America for the
foreseeable future (Smith 2014). Even though he has suggested that the war on terrorism is
ending, Obama has omitted from recent speeches his plant to Pivot towards Asia (Smith 2014).
One thing that may have contributed to this slight change of heart is that the original supporter of
this policy, former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, is no longer in office, and the current
Secretary of State is less concerned with the region (Lieberthal 2011). John Kerry, the current
Secretary of State, does not place as much value on America’s relations with Asia and is more
concerned with the Middle East (White 2014). Therefore, there is not as significant a push for the
Pivot. The Obama administration is simply overwhelmed with other international issues to spend
as much time on the Pivot as is necessary (Sanders 10). Because of this, even just a few years
after the Pivot was introduced, Obama and the American government have pulled back from
many of the initiatives that were begun in 2011. Political paralysis within the government as a
result of things like the budget crisis are also internal issues that have set this policy back (Smith
2014; Manyin et al. 2012, 144; Mohan 2014).
Today’s status of the Pivot is multifaceted. As of today, there are yet to be actual marines
in Australia (The Bangkok Post 2013). Little actual military action has taken place, however, it is
important to remember that there is already much U.S. military presence in Asia in the form of
the Navy. The Pivot has also increased and strengthened U.S. ties with nations that border China
such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and even Burma (Etzioni 2012, 395). America’s relationship
with Japan has been especially important in this process (Clinton 2011, 58). An Open Skies
agreement has also been agreed upon in order for business and people-to-people ties increase and
in order to launch strategic dialogue on the Asia-Pacific (Clinton 2011, 58). However, at the
same time, the American government still remains tied down in both Europe and the Middle
East, limiting its actual involvement in Asia (Schake 2014). Some authors and journalists
maintain that the presidents’ absence at some of the summits or the American governments’
preoccupation with other countries will not hurt the Pivot due to the fact that much of the Pivot is
still in the works and that more “marketing” will not change the policy itself (The Bangkok Post
2013).
Analysis
The Pivot itself is fairly controversial on a multitude of levels. It is not debated that Asia
is rising in influence in the world and that the United States must continue to keep up good
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relations with China. The question is, how should that change in focus be handled and is the
Pivot the right way to handle Asia’s growing influence (in this instance, specifically in relation to
China). Supporters of the Pivot look to it as the very necessary solution to check China’s
growing power and to assist Southeast Asian nations from China’s grip with the promotion of
peace. The opposition to the Pivot make two very important points. The first is that such strong
and immediate action as described in the original document created by Clinton can and will
create tension between the United States and China that could lead to bad consequences.
Secondly, the Pivot was outlined in 2011 and still has not made a lasting or permanent impact in
Asia; the United States has not done what the Pivot said the United States would do and that has
some detrimental effects.
Many advocates of the Pivot suggest that China is a direct threat to the United States.
Currently, there are debates about whether China’s rise can be done peacefully and even if that is
even the intention (Beitelman 2012, 1075). If this is the case, that China does not have peaceful
intent, then military force is needed and the Pivot is a good idea. This entirely depends on China
and on whether it pursues a strategy of peaceful development or not (Beitelman 2012, 1079). The
Pivot provides a way to monitor the situation and intervene quickly if necessary. It also can help
to prevent multipolarity, which is seen by some people as a very unstable situation (Beitelman
2012, 1083). As Clinton makes clear in her statements about the Pivot, she believes that
American work abroad and specifically in China holds the key to security and prosperity at home
(Clinton 2011, 57). Another positive view on the Pivot refers to the Pivot as another example of
American responsibility to lead on the world stage, and as Obama put it, “if we don’t, no one
else well” (Smith 2014).
China has an increasing amount of influence in the South China Sea and claims much of
it as its own (Etzioni 2013, 59). Some authors suggest that these disputes are most often decided
through peaceful means, but there have been skirmishes, not to mention the powerful influence
that China has in the region (Etzioni 2013, 60). The presence of the United States in the region,
people argue, will have a lasting peaceful effect on the unrest in the region. As Clinton states, the
United States is “the only power with a network of strong alliances in the region, no territorial
ambitions, and a long record of providing for the common good” and that the United States is
already deeply involved in Asia economically so should turn more of its official focus on that
area of the world (Clinton 2011, 58). For example, the threat of North Korea will be more
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contained if American relations with South Korea opens up enough to enact certain measures
(Clinton 2011, 58). Also, many key Asian governments in the region have opened their arms
toward more American involvement in order to guard their security and prosperity, specifically
from China (Stuart 2012, 210).
One of the main objections to the pivot is that it will harm American relations with China
unnecessarily. It can be very hard to accurately decipher and discern where China is headed over
time, so action based off of anticipated events are risky (Beitelman 2012, 1074). Sanders’ main
point, which is echoed by many, is that the pivot could have some very detrimental effects on
Sino-American relations (Sanders 10). Uncertainty cannot be the basis of such action, the
opposition says, because otherwise the situation could get worse if the situation is read wrong
(Beitelman 2012, 1094). Most experts agree that it will be many years, decades even before
China will be able to challenge the United States even in their own region (Etzioni 2013, 59).
Robert Ross, in his article “Obama’s New Asia Policy is Unnecessary and Counterproductive,”
says that the shift was based on a fundamental misreading of the intent of the Chinese
government (Ross 2012). He says that China’s tough diplomacy stems from a sense of insecurity
from years of financial crisis and social unrest and that the Pivot might be exacerbating those
issues (Ross 2012). For example, already China and ASEAN have shared concerns that the TPP
might be a force rising intended to sabotage the economic integration of East Asia (Smith 2014).
Some would say that the pivot has done the opposite of providing stability in Asia and that it has
made the region more tense and conflict-prone where the United States is more at risk of
involving itself in fights that do not concern them (Ross 2012). Lanxin Xiang focuses most of his
paper on the risk of creating another Cold War situation between the United States and China
(Xiang 2012, 116). Not only that, but it would definitely risk China’s cooperation on a range of
issues in venues such as the United Nations (Manyin et al. 2012, 144).
Another objection is that America is not actually invested in the plan and is spreading
American resources too thin. Recently, Obama had a decision to either support Japan militarily
over the Senkaku-Diaoyu Island, or choose not to do what, essentially the Pivot said he would do
(White 2014). Washington chose not do support Japan and defend against China and did it again
when Washington was again reluctant to help the Philippines in 2012 with the Scarborough
Shoal issue (White 2014). The opposition uses these examples to show that maybe the United
States is not as committed to the Pivot as it should be. Because of this, China is more likely to
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push the envelope and China could become a real problem (White 2014). Not only that, but there
is worry that China will also be able to convince American allies in Asia of their inability to
commit and alienate these nations from their alliances to the United States (Schake 2014).
Another thing that the opposition finds worrisome is the idea that many American
resources are being used for this Pivot that could be used elsewhere. Beitelman refers to the
former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ pronouncement that America’s interests in the Pacific
will continue irrespective of tough times or tough budget choices (Beitelman 2012, 1088).
Sustaining the Pivot was a question from the beginning but it is increasingly becoming a problem
(Mohan 2014). As Clinton says, in the original document, these people want to call for troops not
to reposition but to “come home” and the downsizing of foreign engagement (Clinton 2011, 57).
Amitai Etzioni makes the point that Pivoting to Asia will prove a major distraction at this point
in time especially from the Middle East and from national issues (Etzioni 2012, 399). This is
especially true when looking at the fact that part of the Pivot is assisting India, a country that is
very close to Pakistan and Iran who are present threats, develop its nuclear program (Etzioni
2012, 399). Some even wonder if Obama just pursued this policy in order to help his public
standing and not to actually commit to it (Victor et al. 2010).
Recommendations
In my opinion, there are many flaws in the Pivot and the United States needs to move
forward with caution. Therefore, for the Pivot, I recommend a few different actions. First off, the
whole mindset of the Pivot comes from feeling threatened by China and all the actions within the
policy reflect this. I suggest the United States stop looking at China from realist perspective or
that growth in China automatically means a decline in America. It is not a zero sum game in
which if one country gains power, the other loses it.
If a realist perspective must be used, Charles Glaser’s model of realists as optimists in his
article, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help” is a good picture of what that should
look like in this instance. Glaser makes note that structural realism, as it is understood today, is
very pessimistic, believing that cooperation between states is nearly impossible and that order
can only be created by hegemony (Glaser 1994, 50). Instead, Glaser outlines a form of realism
called contingent realism which “predicts that, under a wide range of conditions, adversaries can
best achieve their security goals through cooperative policies, not competitive ones, and should,
therefore, choose cooperation when these conditions prevail” (Glaser 1994, 50). To do this, he

11

says that policies that avoid arms races and military build-ups are essential. The Pivot as it is
now, seems to be exactly this military build-up that could provoke an arms race that Glaser says
that realists should try to avoid through cooperation.
As far as tangible changes go, the military and navy in the region, both the proposed
deployment and the present troops must be reduced in order to maintain good relations with
China. Secondly, the United States needs to make a greater effort to show their commitment to
the Southeast Asian nations and make the actual Pivot policy clearer to all. The third is that there
should be an increase in economic and diplomatic documents specifically with China. As the
Chinese government itself has said, “the new model of great-power relations means they
[America] must now change their behavior to accommodate us” (Schake 2014). The Pivot is
often seen by China as a form of containment, which in many ways it is, and therefore the policy
as it stands can easily turn into a great source of tension and already has.
Although China and its rising power, economically and politically, need to be addressed,
the Pivot approaches China from an overly aggressive realist viewpoint. I suggest that instead of
looking at the world with a realist theory, we approach China of a place of trust and economic
competition. I do not suggest that we swing the other way and completely ignore China or
naively believe that everything will be peaceful. As David Beitelman says in his paper
“America’s Pacific Pivot,” it can be difficult to get a clear multi-faceted analysis of Sino-US
relations and that often, “contemporary analyses become trapped in a simplified “panda hugger”
versus “China hawk” characterizations” (Beitelman 2012, 1074). We need to be wary about
oversimplification. The United States of America needs to be wary of having a realist worldview
that frames Sino-US relations in confrontational terms, which could potentially lead to a situation
not unlike the Cold War (Beitelman 2012, 1080; Xiang 2012, 113). As Sanders says, the United
States needs to proceed with “subtle firmness” in order to avoid exacerbating regional
suspicions, which is exactly my suggestion (Sanders 10; Lieberthal 2011).
Thomas Christensen, a soft realist, makes a good point in his article “United States and
China Relations.” He is a realist, but he puts more stock in soft power than in military power.
Although American interactions with China seek to further U.S. national interests in a realist sort
of way, these interactions should not be to try to contain China, but to influence China into the
nation that we want it to be (Christensen 2007, 86). This is an interesting take on the Pivot
because it then changes both the motivation and the anticipated result. Christensen realizes that
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China is a big player in the world economy and recognizes the need for the United States to have
a strong and positive relationship with the nation. Especially for the sake of the international
community, Christensen says that we need to help China frame its choices and encourage the
Chinese government to act responsibly with its new place as an economic power in the world
(Christensen 2007, 87). If we apply these sentiments to the Pivot, it does not even mean that the
realist perspective needs to go by the wayside, it just means that there should be a focus shift
from military power to influence. Especially when thinking about the world economy, I think
that this perspective will give positive results.
The idea that China’s rising automatically means America’s decline is an idea that has no
place within this policy. In fact, most sources agree that Beijing has not evidenced any interest in
becoming a hegemon and replacing the U.S. (Smith 2014; Rudd 2013). Again, Beitelman makes
the point that China as of yet still does not have the power or influence that the United States has
internationally in order to accomplish this (Beitelman 2012, 1078). It must also be remembered
that U.S. decline stats from a very high level and China’s rise comes from a very low one; it’s
more of an economic restoration (Etzioni 2012, 398; Xiang 2012, 121). A hegemon, especially as
Layne defines it, must be in a position of multidimensional power. China is still largely onedimensional in its economic sector (Beitelman 2012, 1078). I would also suggest that such a
power change requires hostility and an attempt to change the status quo. Testimonies from
China’s leaders reveal that there is no such desire to do so (Beitelman 2012, 1078; Smith 2014;
Rudd 2013). It is going to be decades before China becomes a real threat to the United States,
therefore that mindset needs to be erased before we continue along this path. Not only that, but,
as Ross says, policy towards China should assuage, not exploit, Beijing’s anxieties while
protecting US interests in the region (Ross 2012). From China’s view, the West has no reason to
fear China’s rise, in fact the West would probably benefit because of Chinese economic growth,
so such aggressive behavior could be seen as a totally unnecessary direct threat towards Chinese
interests, which is not where we want to go (Rudd 2013).
However, this tension between China and the United States that has developed also must
be addressed. Therefore, I suggest that some proactive measures to reconcile these tensions be
added to the Pivot to be enacted in the region. If the Pivot is to continue, there must be a way to
maintain the Sino-American relationship even as the United States seeks to increase its
involvement in the region. Together, the United States and China accounted for more than 50
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percent of the world’s economic growth in the last five years, it makes sense to preserve a
relationship with them (Christensen 90). If we work with China, even if our goal is still to curb
some of China’s power, concessions can be made and positive relation can form without the need
for military action.
Secondly, the pivot is altogether too focused on military strength. I think that because the
Pivot is 70% a military action, this policy can be seen as leaning too far one way and forgetting
the other aspects of diplomacy. I propose that this be modified too. China is different than the
United States. America has not been threatened by China militarily and there is no history of
warfare as of today with China. In fact, many sources say that the United States has
overestimated China’s military capabilities, which have not deployed any new ship or aircraft
that significantly enhances their ability to challenge US maritime superiority (Ross 2012; Smith
2014). Their main tool to counter the American Navy is a fleet of diesel submarines from the
1990s (Ross 2012). Too many troops without provocation, in my opinion, is not a wise move.
However, there is still value in having some military capability in the area, especially if it is seen
more as a peacekeeping force. There is already a naval force in the Pacific, more troops are not
vital (Ross 2012). Therefore, I propose that the Pivot be modified to decrease the number of
American troops sent to Asia. I think that peace is not just on China’s shoulders. The American
government and the international community must also put forth effort to be sure that Chinese
growth is as peaceful as possible. Not placing a large amount of military force on China’s turf
could be a way of encouraging such action. Both perception and strategic trust have a large part
in this (Beitelman 2012, 1093). Also, such military approaches could threaten China’s economic
holdings, which would not be a good move on the American government’s part. As Clinton says,
a transparent military on the parts of both America and China would be a wise idea in order for
both countries to see the military intentions of the other. This part of the Pivot should remain
(Clinton 2011, 59).
Also, the United States needs to commit to this idea if it is going to happen. The
American government has proven its commitment to Europe especially through recent action in
the face of Russia in Ukraine (White 2014). So why can’t the United States show that same level
of commitment in Asia? Many Southeast Asian nations expect, with the Pivot, for assistance
from the United States. We need to support our decisions and follow-through. Not only that, but
the Pivot needs to be clarified to all involved and rewritten for more coherence and, hopefully,
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permanence (Eyal 2014). As Etzioni says, if the United States continues to leave Southeast Asian
nations to fend for themselves after the promise of support, the Asian nations will “inevitably
conclude that the US is an unreliable ally” (Etzioni 2013, 60). On multiple occasions now,
Obama has failed to mention the Pivot as a central aspect to American foreign policy in recent
speeches (Smith 2014). Right now, American resources are being diffused among too many
competing demands for the Pivot to actually be realized.
I suggest that in order for the Pivot to make a real impact, that America cut ties with
some other engagements around the world. With China, history has taught us that the most
effective way of dealing with the Chinese government is through leader to leader interaction,
which can only happen if there is a real shift in focus (Rudd 2013). The American government is
very contentious, however, and with tensions in the Middle East, where the U.S. already has
many resources, it may be difficult for this to actually happen. If this is the case, the government
still needs to choose where they are going to focus their resources, even if it means backing off
entirely from the Pivot. At this point, being somewhat committed is actually causing a lot more
harm than it is worth.
Lastly, I would also encourage increasing economic relations with China. A big part of
the Pivot is economic involvement in Asia, although recently the long-term economic interests
seem to have been subordinated to the short-term political/military objectives (Prestowitz 2012,
44). As a largely untapped area of the world economically, I think it would be valuable to
continue our economic relations with China. Not only would it help the Sino-US relations
diplomatically, it would also be mutually beneficial. The Pivot does, in some ways, seek to
increase its economic presence in the region and in this, I think it has the right idea. The idea is
that competition does not guarantee conflict and that the Pivot is trying to harness that
competition for American economic benefit. However, because of all the military action and the
economic institutions that exclude China like the TPP, the Pivot is very aggressive and
threatening to China, which in many ways undermines this goal. It is possible though, to
continue to form and develop an economically competitive market with China without any sort
of military conflict according to many sources and examples in the world (Beitelman 2012,
1090). If the United States is going to be in Asia for the long haul, both China and the United
States must look ahead and reach some sort of long-term agreement in order to avoid a major
confrontation (Rudd 2013). This will require both countries to understand each other thoroughly
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and, as mentioned before, build some sort of trust. The Policy as it stands now will not be able to
preserve the peace. As such, the United States should introduce a new framework for cooperation
with China that recognizes strategic competition between the two countries and key areas of
shared interests that both countries can cooperate on as discussed in Kevin Rudd’s article,
“Beyond the Pivot” (Rudd 2013). According to Rudd, such actions would reduce the regional
temperature and focus both countries on both economic growth and common agendas, thereby
benefitting both countries.
In conclusion, although attention must be turned towards China, the Pivot as it is outlined
in “America’s Pacific Century”, I contend, is not the most beneficial way to do so. Most agree
that “the Obama administration is right to be seeking a comprehensive 21st-century U.S. trade
and globalization policy” as Prestowitz says, however, the Pivot as it is presently is not a solution
(Prestowitz 2012, 45). The Pivot is a way to focus on Asia and to become more involved with
Asian affairs through military, diplomatic, and economic means, as a way to increase the United
States’ diplomatic, economic, and strategic standing in Asia, especially in comparison with
China. Even though this policy may provide the United States with the power to contain China if
China becomes more of threat and to help the Southeast Asian nations that are unable to stand up
to China, it may also harm our own relation to the Chinese government, exacerbate the problems
already in the region, and unnecessarily use our resources. Therefore, I propose a change in our
mindset as a starting point to modify the Pivot, for although the Pivot has problems, the idea
behind it is valid. Changes political theory, military strength, commitment, and increasing
economic relations are my proposed adaptation of the policy as we look to move forward with
our relations with China in the hopes that both countries will benefit and flourish.
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Part II: Partnership or Threat? The Philippine Perspective
Throughout history, the Philippines has had a particularly strong tie to the United States.
Beginning with its American colonization, and ending with today’s strong economic and
political ties, the United States of America has always been a strong ally to the Philippines in
many ways. The Pivot Policy of 2011 is no different; it seems to reflect those close economic
and political ties between the American and Philippine governments. By analyzing the tangible
changes caused by the Pivot to the Philippine economy, military, and relationships with other
nations, the various arguments for and against such an increase in relations with the United
States can be identified. Through this analysis, various conclusions can be made as to the
International Relations theory that is being used by the Philippine government and what they will
likely do next.
The Philippines has had a long history of foreign occupation and war. In 1521, Magellan
arrived in the Philippines to claim the archipelago for Spain. Spain finally colonized the islands
in 1565 ().i The Spanish then occupied the Philippines all the way up to 1898, when the Spanish
were defeated by American ships that arrived in Manila Bay.ii December 12th of that year was
when the Treaty of Paris was signed, which ended the Spanish-American War and ceded the
Philippines to the United States for $20 million.iii Although this action was not recognized by
Filipino leaders, who had control of the entire archipelago, except for Manila, afterwards the
Philippines belonged to the United States.iv
The very next year, in February, fighting broke out between the United States and
Filipino forces, which began the Philippine-American War. This war lasted for three and a half
years of official war (1899-1902) and ten years of overall conflict. About 400,000 Filipino lives
were lost in comparison to the 10,000 American lives.v Many consider this war to actually be just
an extension and continuation of the Philippine Revolution against the Spanish rule. In 1901,
Subic Bay was designated the principal U.S. Naval Station in the Philippines, it was also the year
that the Sedition Law was put into place, a law which gave the death penalty or long prison
sentence to anyone advocating for Philippine independence.vi Most of the war was fought
through guerilla warfare until most of the guerillas were pushed back onto the island of Samar
where they continued their guerrilla tactics and resistance until 1906 when the U.S. gain
undisputed control of the islands.vii It was not until 1934 that the Philippines started its journey
towards independence. The Tydings-McDuffle Act of 1934 provided for a 10 year
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Commonwealth status for the Philippines in order to prepare for independence. Political
independence was finally achieved on July 4, 1946 and in 1992, the Subic Naval base was finally
closed.viii Finally, after three hundred and eighty five years of submission to various Western
nations, the Philippines was politically free.
The Pivot is essentially a refocus of American resources from the Middle East to East
Asia. Accompanying this refocus are increased defense treaty alliances with Australia, Japan,
South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines.ix This increased American presence along with an
increase in warships and aircraft are meant to counter the rise of an increasingly assertive China
in the South China Sea, especially as it seems that China has become emboldened and has been
supposedly challenging and undermining regional stability.x The goal is to shift 60% of all U.S.
naval assets to the Pacific by the year 2020.xi America is trying to “reinvigorate,” as one source
would say, its security alliances with its partners in the region, especially in the Philippines.xii
Along with the military changes, there are also economic changes, primarily through the
establishment of trade agreements such as the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership). The United
States’ goal is for the TPP to surpass all other East and South Asian trade groupings.xiii
This new pivot has a series of real implications for the Philippines specifically. The first
is that the Philippine government has agreed to a ten-year agreement to allow thousands of
troops to be temporarily based in the Philippines, twenty years after the last United States
military bases were completely closed down.xiv This also allowed for more visits by US aircraft
and a rotation presence of U.S. marines.xv The Philippines has also offered Washington a greater
access to its military facilities in exchange for the modernization of its military and arms.xvi The
American government has approved the transfer of a patrol ship to the Philippine Navy and
tripled its military assistance to $30 million in 2012 to fulfill this bargain.xvii The US military
will likely continue to increase over the next few years. In fact, two American nuclear armed
submarines have already made port calls in Subic Bay.xviii
The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is the embodiment of these changes.xix
The EDCA, as it is called, is a “reconfiguration of the Philippine-US bilateral security
partnership towards the development of a minimum credible defense posture in light of the
changing geostrategic environment.”xx This allows US military access to and use of many
facilities of the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) especially for joint ventures, but is not a
permanent base because the Philippine constitution bans any sort of permanent US presence. xxi

21

Such action also increases the US Navy response time in order to help in situations such as the
devastation of Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 and allows the US to have greater operational flexibility
in the region.xxii
Not only that, but this increased alliance with the Philippines has made the Philippines a
hub for American forces. This year, in fact, the Australian, Japanese, and South Korean
militaries for the first time participated in the Balikatan (meaning shoulder to shoulder) USPhilippine exercise.xxiii However, as Chris Brose, a foreign policy adviser, has told Washington,
“The question is not whether America is doing something. Clearly America is. The question is
whether what America is doing adds up to a set of actions that’s fundamentally impacting
China’s calculus.”xxiv
It is well known that the Philippine people are very pro-American. In fact, public opinion
has generally supported this increase in relations with the United States, which means that the
Philippines has welcomed the enhanced cooperation with the United States.xxv Many attribute
this support to the shared history, common values, common strategic and economic interests, and
commitment to freedom and democracy.xxvi Actually, Filipino is the largest foreign-born group
in the U.S. armed forces, there are an estimated 150,000 Americans living in the Philippines and
there are about four million Filipino Americans in the United States.xxvii Clearly, the two nations
have a strong connection. Statistically speaking, there is a 62%+ tcrust rate of the United States,
in contrast with 55% percent of the population who have little trust of China.xxviiiManila is the
most vocal in criticizing China’s aggressive moves in the region.xxix
Generally speaking, this new “pivot” towards Asia is looked upon favorably by the
Philippine government. Manila has warmly welcomed the US military presence in South East
Asia.xxx In fact, most political leaders in the Philippines, except the far left-leaning parties,
support this intensification of relations with their already-ally the United States.xxxi This is in
contrast with some of the other nations in the region, such as Thailand. This is due to a variety of
reasons. First, the Philippines does not have the economic ties with China that countries like
Thailand do. Although Thailand has been a treaty ally of the U.S. since 1954, it has been
unwilling to further open its territory to the United States as the Philippines has.xxxii This is due
to the fact that Thailand fears that strong ties with the United States would compromise its
vibrant trade with China and since they have refused further American ties, they have upped their
ties with China.xxxiii The Philippines, on the other hand, does not have those same strong
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economic ties to China since President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo left office. In fact, the United
States is the Philippines’ largest source of FDIs and is also the Philippines’ second largest trade
partner.xxxiv In 2012, only 12.4% of the Philippines’ exports go to China whereas 15.6% go to the
United States.xxxv
Secondly, there are political factors in the area that make an extended alliance with the
United States ideal. Primarily, the Philippines is having some territorial disputes with China over
the Scarborough Shoal. China has sent combat ready patrols to defend the shoal and after the
Philippines was forced to withdraw, established a permanent presence.xxxvi Especially with the
presence of large oil reserves within that area, both countries are trying to claim it as their
own.xxxvii With the increased militarization that the Philippines has received from the United
States, the Philippines, the timing of American involvement appears to be perfect in order to
continue to stand up to China for its territory.xxxviii Without the militarization and build-up of the
Navy that the Philippines has received from the U.S. with the EDCA, there would be no way that
the Philippines could stand up to China. In fact, in July of 2014, President Aquino announced
that he may ask the US to deploy spy planes in the Philippines’ territory in the South China Sea,
or the West Philippine Sea, as the Philippines would prefer.xxxix
Not only that, but Philippine President Benigno Aquino has begun to transfer national
focus from internal issues to external issues and it is the perfect time to strengthen ties with
allies. Because the Philippines has been so concerned with domestic struggles, its navy and
airforce are very weak since the military has received all of the resources.xl The Pivot came at a
perfect time for the Philippines to receive many resources necessary from the United States.
Agreements such as the EDCA also help to cover non-military issues such as human rights and
relief aid.xli As one author put it, “The Philippines needs to attain minimum defense credibility,
enhance its maritime domain awareness, improve its capacity to enforce its laws over its waters,
and cooperate on traditional and non-traditional security issues such as humanitarian action and
disaster response with other countries on the same level.”xlii This renewed alliance with the
United States can help the Philippines attain those things. Basically, the United States’ desire to
maintain a credible presence in South East Asia is the Philippines’ perfect opportunity get as
much as it can out of a strengthened relationship with the U.S.A.xliii
Finally, the Philippines has also started to see China as an overarching existential threat
to their wellbeing.xliv Other nations in the region still have strong relations with China and
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therefore do not have this issue. In fact, this has created a new facet in the Philippines’
relationship with the United States.
However, there are also a few reservations about this renewed relationship with the
United States. The first is the question of the reliance of the United States. Valerie Sanders, in
her article entitled “The U.S. and Asia: What Pivot?” puts it the best when she writes, “President
Obama’s decision… to cancel visits to U.S. allies in the region, has led many to ask whether the
pivot is simply a rhetorical device without any real substance to it.”xlv Most sources that question
the pivot first question America’s commitment to the Pivot, especially in the last two years. In
fact, as the United States has seemed to back off from the region in the past two years, China has
responded with concrete policies and actions.xlvi Although the US has significantly increased its
warships and resources to Asia despite budget woes, these absences and a seeming indifference
to the pivot in recent speeches still invoke doubt. Since Washington is still grappling with the
Middle East, then growing tension in the South and East China Seas that could depend on US
intervention become periphery concerns, which is an issue that greatly concerns the
Philippines.xlvii Some even say that the U.S. created overblown expectations for the Pivot and are
now paying the price because now countries in the area are questioning Obama’s reliability. Not
only that, but countries like the Philippines who are America’s allies who rely on external
security guarantors like the U.S. to ensure peace are starting to look vulnerable since America
does not appear to be there.xlviii
Some would say, however, that the Pivot itself has begun to exacerbate the issues that the
Philippines has with China instead of fixing them; that the Pivot has lead to increased tensions in
the region.xlix They say that the increased relationship between the United States and the
Philippines has caused China to proverbially flex is muscles to push back. They see the increased
economic relationship as a threat. For example, it was not until the Philippines began to increase
and expand its alliance with the United States in 2011 that the territorial dispute began to get
worse.l China also seemed to be “punishing” the Philippines when it started to ban Philippine
bananas. It also bears mentioning that when this happened, the US bought the country’s bananas
instead, which shows how much China’s actions are also contributing to the Philippines’ turn
towards the United States.li Not only that, but some sources say that Philippine-made goods are
being held at Chinese ports for nontariff-related “issues.”lii
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President Aquino is attempting to maintain diplomatic and economic relations with China
while he tries to actively oppose China’s actions in the West Philippine Sea, but it has become
very difficult to do so; he did not even attend the 10th China-ASEAN expo.liii In fact, since the
pivot began, President Aquino has cancelled some Chinese-funded projects because of
irregularities during his anti-corruption platform.liv This is not without cost, however. Although
China is not the Philippines’ main trade partner, but trade with China is still a valuable part of
Philippine economy. Not only that, but China is the fourth largest provider of development
assistance to the Philippine Islands and is the second largest provider of concessional loans to the
country.lv Losing these things will hurt the Philippines’ economy immensely. The Philippines’
relationship with the United States also seems to be harmful to the Philippines’ relationship with
other Southeast Asian nations who have given some negative sentiment for appearing to cleave
more closely to Washington that any other nation in the region.lvi Instead of mellowing the
region, the Pivot seems to have further complicated the area. In essence, China seems to be
challenging and testing the U.S. to see what America will do and the relations between China
and the Philippines specifically have been the most worrisome.
Traditionally, the United States has deterred regional powers in this region from resorting
to aggression by showing that the US is interested in maintaining freedom of navigation.
However, now, the US has been inserted directly into the legally complex disputes of the
region.lvii This in and of itself is cause for the Philippines to be wary. There is some fear that
America’s actions are solely motivated by the purpose of protecting American hegemony and
interject Washington deeply into Asia’s economy.lviii In fact, ASEAN itself has shared concerns
that TPP and America’s other economic action might be issues.lix Not only that, but American
action could be considered unconstitutional and against the VFA (Visiting Forces Agreement) of
1999 in the Philippines. Both of these things establish the U.S. military force in the Philippines
as a non-combat role and outlaws any permanent base of operations for the U.S. military on
Philippine land.lx People do not want to go rushing into an agreement that is going to go poorly
for them later.
Looking at the way the Philippines has responded and reacted to the events in the region
in the last few years, it is clear that the Philippine government is employing a variety of
International Relations theories. I would suggest that it is employing a neorealist theory in
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regards to its own region of Asia and a neoliberal theory at a larger level, especially in relation to
the United States.
The Philippines especially shows neorealist theory in the instance of its relationship with
China and the territorial disputes of the Scarborough Shoal. Neorealism is characterized by its
realist views of anarchy and that every nation is just looking out for its own interests with an
added view that nations seek to increase their relative power and are equal in terms of needs but
not in capability. The Philippines is seeking to increase its relative power to the other nations in
the region especially through its defense of the disputed territory in the West Philippine Sea.
However, at the same time, it realizes the need to work with more powerful nations since
although each nation has the same needs, there is a difference in ability to achieve those needs or
goals.
However, on the other hand, the Philippines also welcomes partnership with the United
States and this seems to indicate a neoliberal view. The neoliberal view is characterized by the
idea that nations can successfully work and cooperate in the international system. Although some
Philippine skeptics point to the dangers of the Pivot and of American involvement in the Pacific,
the government seems to think that their nation and the United States can successfully cooperate
with one another without too many negative consequences. Although this is a debatable view, the
government clearly acts on it.
It is clear that due to these sentiments, the Philippine government will most likely
continue on the political route that they are on. Regionally, it is likely that the Philippines will
continue to fight for the Scarborough Shoal and defy China, especially if the United States
continues to support the Philippine military. Internationally, the Philippines will also continue to
maintain a strong relationship with the United States, relying on the U.S. for military and
economic support.
In conclusion, the Pivot to Asia that the United States has enacted in the past four years,
has many implications for the Philippines, both good and bad. Very early in the history of the
Philippines, there has been a strong relationship between the Philippines and the United States of
America. This shared history has influenced the fact that the Philippines has had a strong
relationship with the United States for a long time. Although the Philippine government has
opened its arms to heightened American involvement, it is still necessary to analyze the positive
and negative factors of the Pivot from the Philippine perspective. Through looking at the
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economic, military, and relational changes that occur because of the Pivot and how the
Philippines has responded, one can assess the Philippine government’s actions and reasoning
according to both neorealism and neoliberalism.
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